Justice and predictability in torts

Recent reexaminations of the principles of tort liability have entertained two possible rationales for the fault principle, one "moral" and the other economic. Neither is satisfactory. I propose here a third rationale and show how it suffices to refute at least some of the challenges to the negligence system. The character of this rationale is causal, and the central thesis of this paper is that in as much as the tort system should aim to place the costs of accidents on the source of those accidents, then we have not yet found an acceptable alternative to the negligence system. This thesis is defended and developed through a reexamination of some recent theories of strict liability and reflection on some of what has been said about the role of causation in torts. A backdrop to the entire discussion is the question of how one might best ensure that potential defendants will be able to predict with reasonable certainty which courses of action will make them liable, should damages ensue

The contribution of Nicomachean ethics iii5 to Aristotle's theory of responsibility

This paper develops a radical reinterpretation of the argument in Nicomachean Ethics iii 5 concerning responsibility for character. I argue that what is at stake is the new standard of liability Aristotle is introducing there, the so-called "negligence" standard, and that the scope of the discussion is limited to the class of agents who are negligent through an inability to take care. Thus, I argue, there is no claim being made that in general responsibility for acts requires responsibility for character

Explanations reconsidered

Edna Ullmann-Margalit .introduced the notion of an invisiblehand explanation (I-H explanation) to the philosophical literature in 1978, and made a distinction between "aggregate" and "functional-evolutionary" (F-E) forms of I -H explanations. The present paper produces a substantially refined analysis of the forms and functions of I-H explanations. Sections (1) and (2) introduce the ideas of I-H and aggregate I-H explanation, respectively. Section (J) argues that no one form of explanation can serve the explanatory fUnctions Ullmann-Margalit attributes to aggregate explanations, and divides those explanatory functions between genetic and "systematic-dispositional" explanations. Section (4) identifies difficulties with the idea of F-E explanation in the social realm, and shows that any I-H explanations fitting the P-E mold would constitute simply a special class of "aggregate" explanation

Invisible-Hand Explanations Reconsidered

Edna Ullmann-Margalit introduced the notion of an invisible hand explanation (I-H explanation) to the philosophical literature in 1978, and made a distinction between "aggregate" and "functional-evolutionary" (F-E) forms of I-H explanations. The present paper produces a substantially refined analysis of the forms and functions of I-H explanations. Sections (1) and (2) introduce the ideas of I-H and aggregate I-H explanation, respectively. Section (J) argues that no one form of explanation can serve the explanatory functions Ullmanri-Margalit attributes to aggregate explanations, and divides those explanatory functions between genetic and "systematic-dispositional" explanations. Section (4) identifies difficulties with the idea of F-E explanation in the social realm, and shows that any I-H explanations fitting the F-E mold would constitute simply a special class of "aggregate" explanation

Invisible-Hand Explanations Reconsidered

Edna Ullmann-Margalit introduced the notion of an invisible hand explanation (I-H explanation) to the philosophical literature in 1978, and made a distinction between "aggregate" and "functional-evolutionary" (F-E) forms of I-H explanations. The present paper produces a substantially refined analysis of the forms and functions of I-H explanations. Sections (1) and (2) introduce the ideas of I-H and aggregate I-H explanation, respectively. Section (J) argues that no one form of explanation can serve the explanatory functions Ullmanri-Margalit attributes to aggregate explanations, and divides those explanatory functions between genetic and "systematic-dispositional" explanations. Section (4) identifies difficulties with the idea of F-E explanation in the social realm, and shows that any I-H explanations fitting the F-E mold would constitute simply a special class of "aggregate" explanation

A companion to the philosophy of education /

Includes bibliographical references and index

Parens patriae : a comparative legal study of sovereign authority and public education policy in the province of Ontario and the state of New York

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester, Margaret Warner Graduate School of Education and Human Development, 2009.This is a comparative legal study of how courts in the Province of Ontario and the State of New York have interpreted and applied the common law doctrine of parens patriae, the mechanism by which the state exercises plenary custodial authority in the welfare and developmental interests of children. Chapter One traces the history of the doctrine from a Crown prerogative in feudal England to the common law basis for compulsory schooling legislation in the United States and Canada during the Progressive Era. Chapter Two provides a comparative jurisprudential history of the constitutional contexts in which provincial and state courts have exercised parens patriae authority. Supreme Court opinions from the Progressive Era to the present containing the key terms ‘parens patriae’ and ‘education’ are presented chronologically. Chapter Three examines how courts in New York and Ontario have interpreted and applied the doctrine of parens patriae when the custodial interests of children have been threatened by unreasonableness on the part of their custodians in the post-Yoder era. Chapter Four enumerates principles underlying the exercise of parens patriae authority supported by evidence gleaned from the judicial opinions surveyed in the preceding chapters. Chapter Five presents some theory and policy implications of a parens patriae perspective and examines the post-Yoder phenomenon of ‘homeschooling’ in Ontario and New York. The chapter concludes with comments on the limits of sovereign authority in each jurisdiction

Kant and the moral necessity of civil society

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. Dept. of Philosophy, 2009.Kant’s political theory has not received as much attention or analysis from commentators as is enjoyed by other areas of his thought. This appears to be due to one of two assumptions: either that Kant’s political writings were merely tangential to his philosophical system, a kind of end-of-life dabbling in other studies; or that if Kant intended the political writings to be part and parcel of his overall philosophical project, he failed to demonstrate it as such. I argue that both assumptions are incorrect. There is good textual evidence that Kant intended his political writings to be taken as part of the whole of his philosophy, and throughout that body of work, the conceptual framework exists to make the connection evident. Fundamental to Kant’s philosophy is an examination and understanding of the nature of man. Kant’s epistemology, ontology, and metaphysics all support the consideration of man qua noumenon and man qua phenomenon. In Chapter 2, I introduce the concept of reciprocity as the bridge between those two realms. Reciprocity is at work in Kant’s earliest writings, as he argued in favor of a Leibnizian doctrine of ‘living forces.’ But reciprocity evolves for Kant in such a way as to avoid the ‘pre-established harmony’ that he believed undermined the very agency that a living force represents. Through historical and textual exegesis, I seek to illuminate the concept of reciprocity as bridging both the physical and metaphysical aspect of human action. With reciprocity as a ‘dynamical’ concept, I proceed, in Chapter 3, with a defense of the Kantian claim that the formulations of the categorical imperative introduced in the Groundwork are indeed equivalent. It is the claim of equivalency that shows the necessary connection of politics to Kant’s ethical theory. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the content of Kantian morality, as derived by the categorical imperative. In particular, I wish to show that an individual’s duties to himself and to others require him to be an active participant in civil society. Chapters 6 and 7 present the essential aspects of civil society according to Kant and the reciprocal nature of duty between citizens and their government. These requirements demonstrate the true moral necessity of pursuing a ‘rightful condition.

A normative ethical analysis of school discipline practices

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. Margaret Warner Graduate School of Education and Human Development, 2013.This is a normative ethical analysis of school discipline policies. The overarching objective of this work is to inform school practices that directly benefit students. Chapter one examines the current state and practices of student discipline within schools. It focuses upon the pervasive use of suspensions to deal with non-violent student offenses and the adverse consequences that result from the applications of suspensions. Chapter two analyses three theoretical frameworks as they inform the developmental of a threshold for the ethical application of punishment. Developmental liberalism informs the understanding of the role that schools have in exhausting educative measures before the use of force, Self-Determination theory provides the foundation for psychologically nurturing school environments as necessary for the curtailing of adverse student behaviors, and School Community theory acknowledges the essential aspects of curriculum in engaging students. Chapter three sets forth a model for making ethical decisions within schools, and provides an analysis of principles and educational aims that directly inform this process. Chapter four explores the “crime and punishment” phenomenon within school discipline and provides the theoretical rationale that is offered to support such arguments. The chapter concludes with a discussion of when, if ever, it is appropriate to suspend students from school. Chapter five examines existing approaches to student discipline that align with the requirements of the threshold for ethical application of discipline and a well-informed ethical decision making process